A zap is a two-round, witness-indistinguishable protocol in which the first round, consisting of a message from the verifier to the prover, can be fixed "once-and-for-all" and a p plied to any instance, and where the verifier does not use amy private coins. 0 We present a zap for every language in NP, based on the existence of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the shared random string model. The zap is in the standard model, and hence requires no common guaranteed random string.
Introduction
A zap is a two-round witness-indistinguishable protocol in which the first round, consisting of a message from the verifier to the prover, can be fixed "once-and-for-all" and a p plied to any instance and where the verifier does not use any private coins. That is, the system remains sound and witness-indistinguishable even if the statements to be proven are chosen after the first-round message is fixed. We present zaps for every language in NP based on the existence of noninteractive zero-knowledge proof systems (NIZKs) in the shared random string model'. The zap is in the standard model, and hence requires no common guaranteed-random string. Using current NIZK technology, zaps can be based on any family of trapdoor permutations.
Not only can zaps be constructed from NIZKs, but the converse holds as well. This result (and its proof) gives a somewhat formal view of zaps, but yields little intuition for why zaps and NIZKs exist at all. Indeed, our first constructions of zaps were not based on NIZKs, but relied on the (new) notion of a verifiable pseudo-random bit generator, or VPRG. Roughly speaking, a pseudo-random sequence is verifiable if a party knowing the pseudo-random seed can construct verifiable proofs of the bits of the pseudorandom sequence. Moreover, a VPRG producing some number k of bits passes what we call the "ith bit test" for all 1 5 i 5 k: given proofs of the values of all but the ith bit in the sequence, it is computationally infeasible to guess the ith bit with a non-negligible advantage over 1/2. ' We give constructions for VPRGs and a relaxation, approximate VPRGs. The importance of VPRGs is this: Zaps (and NIZKs) exist if and only if approximate VPRGs exist in the standard model. We present applications of zaps in several models. Specifically, we construct faster implementations of important cryptographic primitives in each of the standard, timingbased, and resettable models. Although in some cases the absolute improvement in rounds may be modest, the number of rounds that we achieve in each case is within 1 of the best possible. For example, all previous witnessindistinguishable proof systems require at least three rounds of communication. Zaps achieve witness indistinguishability in two rounds. The fact that zaps also yield non-constructive one-round witness-indistinguishability suggests that proving a lower bound of two rounds is unlikely.
Perhaps the most interesting application is in the timing model of Dwork, Nmr, and Sahai, where, using moderately hard functions [9] and timed commitments 151, we obtain 3-round concurrent black-box zero knowledge proofs of knowledge for all of NP. 3-round black-box zero-knowledge with timing (even without concurrency) is interesting in its own right: it is well known that in the standard model (no timing) this is impossible (assuming N P $ BPP) [16] , while the possibility of concurrency implies that at least eight rounds are required [22, 271; thus, adding timing allows us to go well below the lower bounds in the standard model.
We also use zaps to construct 2-round deniable authentication protocols [8, 10, 11, 121 . Intuitively, deniable authentication is like a signature scheme in that it permits one party to authenticate messages to another party; however, unlike in the case of digital signatures, the authenticating conversation "leaves no trace," for example, it may be simulable, and hence can be effectively repudiated.
The relative ease with which we are able to reduce the amount of interaction provides further motivation for the timing model of [ll] -in our opinion a more realistic one than the shared guaranteed random string model (see e.g.
[7]) -and a complexity theory of moderately hard functions [9] .
Using zaps and timed commitments we also obtain a different type of improvement on the results in [ll, 121. The timing model requires a mild "(a, p)" assumption about the relative rates of the clocks of non-faulty processors, and the protocols in [ll] require processors (typically, the prover), to wait until an interval of at least , B 2 a time has elapsed (as measured on the processor's own clock). a and p are chosen so as to tolerate actual system and communication delays. The proofs in [ll, 121 require the parameters to be set according to the slowest non-faulty processors. Our new techniques permit flexibility in this respect: fast verifiers with good communication links to the prover are not forced to suffer delays due to slower concurrent verifiers.
In the standard model, without timing assumptions, we obtain a 2-round oblivious transfer protocol based on the quadratic residuousity assumption and using public keys; without public keys the protocol requires three rounds. These results are omitted for lack of space. Very recently, Naor and Pinkas were able to modify our approach to produce a different protocol with similar security properties; their protocol is based on DDH, requires two rounds, and does not use zaps explicitly [24] .
Finally, we consider a model of computation in which the prover's use of randomness is severely restricted, as, for example, in the case of a smart card, in which the prover may have a short embedded truly random seed and read-only memory. Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [6] give one formalization, termed resettable zero-knowledge (rZK). Informally, a protocol protects a witness (either in the zeroknowledge sense or in the indistinguishability sense) in the resettable model if the protection holds even if the prover may be restarted (reset) many times and forced to repeatedly use the same random tape (the prover may also be restarted using a different, but still random, tape).
Using zaps and timed commitments, we construct a 3-round timing-based rZK proof system for any language in NP. As noted in (61, rZK proofs cannot be proofs of knowledge, so, despite the connections between smart-card, resettable, and concurrent zero-knowledge [6, 201, this result is incomparable with our 3-round concurrent-ZK proofs of knowledge.
We also observe that 2-round (and even non-constructive 1-round) resettable witness-indistinguishability is easily obtained from a zap, simply by having the prover's "random" bits in the zap be a pseudo-random function of the verifier's initial message and the input. This improves (both in conceptual and round complexity) upon the Sround resettable witness-indistinguishability results in [6] .
In all our protocols that employ timing, only the verifier needs access to a (local) clock. This is particularly appealing in the resettable case, in which the prover may be a smart card, since the card may not be equipped with a clock.
2
Throughout this paper we assume that all machines run in probabilistic polynomial time; thus, our use of the term "proof" instead of "argument" is (slightly) non-standard.
Let v(n) denote a function that grows more slowly than the inverse of any polynomial, i.e., for all c > 0 there is a n no such that v(n) < l/nC for all n 2 no.
Brief Review of Cryptographic Primitives
Interactive P r o o f Systems and Zero Knowledge
The concepts described here are due to Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [19] . An intemctive protocol is a pair (P'V) of interactive probabilistic ptime machines, the prover P and the verifier V, where P has two inputs x and yI and V has inputs x and z. The protocol (P, V) is an interactive proof for the language L if the following two conditions hold (we let n denote the size of x):
1. Completeness: For all x E L, there exists a y such that
where the probabilities are over the coin flips of both machines. Let (P, V ) ( z , y, z) denote the transcript of the conversation between P and V when P's input is (x,y) and V's input is (x,z). Then (P, V) is zero-knowledge if for every (possibly cheating) verifier V', there exists a (probabilistic ptime machine) simulator S, such that for all deterministic psize circuit family tests T and all x, y, z such that W(x, y), where the probability in the first (resp., second) term is over the random choices of P and V' (resp., S).
P r o o f s of Knowledge [13]
Let L be an NP language accepted by a nondet.erministic polynomial time Turing machine ML. A Computation path is a sequence of nondeterministic choices made by ML. The set of accepting computation paths on input x E L is the witness set of x, denoted ~( x ) . An interactive proof of knowledge system for N P language L is a pair of algorithms (P, V) satisfying: 
where the probability is over the coin flips of V and M.
The soundness condition is very strong: since it holds Vw' we have in particular that P' need not flip coins since its favorable coin tosses can be incorporated into w'. Note that if x 4 L, then w ( x ) = 0, so the probability that V accepts is negligible. A proof of knowledge is zero knowledge if it satisfies the definition of zero knowledge.
Witness Indistinguishability
The concept of witness indistinguishability was proposed by Feige and Shamir 1131 as a relaxation of zero-knowledge. Unlike the case with zero-knowledge, witness indistinguishability is closed under parallel and concurrent composition. , and for all avziliary inputs z to V', the distribution o n the views of V' following a n execution (P, V')(x, w1, z) is indistinguishable from the distribution on the views of V' following an execution (P, V')(x, w z , z ) .
Note that the auxiliary input t can even be the two witnesses w1, wz. Thus, even knowing both witnesses, V' should not be able to distinguish which witness is being used by P . 
Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems
The following discussion is based on [8, 14, 261: A (single theorem) non-interactive proof system for a language L allows one party P to prove membership in L to another party V for any x E L. P and V initially share a string U of length polynomial in the security parameter TI which is trusted to have been chosen at random. To prove membership of a string x in L, = Ln (0, l},, P sends a message x as a proof of membership. V decides whether to accept or to reject the proof x as function of x and U . Non-interactive zero knowledge proof systems were introduced in (3, 21. Noninteractive zero-knowledge schemes for proving membership in any language in N P may be based on any trapdoor permutation (see [14, 211) . Assuming a trapdoor permutation on k bits, the length of a proof of a satisfiable circuit of size M (and the size of the shared random string) is O ( M k 2 ) .
We assume that the shared string U is generated according to the uniform distribution on strings of length polynomial in n and k, where the polynomial depends on the particular protocol.
Let L be in NP and for any x E L let w(x) be the set of strings that witness the membership of x in L , as described above. For the proof system to be of any use, P must be able to operate in polynomial time if it is given a witness w E ~( x ) .
We call this the tractability assumption for P . In general w is not available to V . Let P N ( x , w , a ) be the distribution of the proofs generated by P on input x , witness w , and shared string u. Suppose that P sends V a proof x when the shared random string is U . Then the pair ( U , x ) is called the "conversation".
Any x E L and w E w(x) induces a probability distribution C O N V ( x , w ) on conversations ( u , x ) where U is a shared string and A E P N ( x , w , U ) is a proof.
For the system to be zero-knowledge, there must exist a simulator Sim which, on input x , generates a conversation (u,p). Let Sim(x) be the distribution on the conversations that Sim generates on input x , let Simu(x) = Simu be the distribution on the U part of the conversation, and let Simp(x) be the distribution on the proof component. In the definitions of [2, 141 the simulator has two steps: it first outputs Simu without knowing x , and then, given x , it outputs Simp(x).
Let ACCEPT(u, x ) = {AIV accepts on input U , x , x } and let REJECT(u,x) = { A~V rejects on input u , x , A } . Note that this definition of NIZK does not require that the system be sound if the instance x is chosen after the public random string is known. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently strong for our purposes.
As shown in [14] Note that general witness indistinguishability implies witness indistinguishability even if X I = . . . = x m r which will be the case of interest here.
Deniable Authentication
A public key authentication scheme permits an authenticator AP to convince a second party V, only having access to AP's public-key, that AP is willing to authenticate a message m. However, unlike in the case of digital signatures, deniable authentication does not permit V to convince a third party that AP has authenticated m -there is no "paper trail" of the conversation (say, other than what could be produced by V alone). Thus, deniable authentication is incomparable with digital signatures. Deniable authentication first appeared in [8, lo] ; and was formalized in [11] (see also [12] ). Several 4-round timed concurrent deniable authentication protocols are given in [ll, 121
The authentication protocol should satisfy:
Completeness: For any message m, if the prover and verifier follow the protocol for authenticating m, then the verifier accepts.
Soundness -Existential Unforgeability Against Chosen
Message Attack: Suppose that AP is willing to authenticate any polynomial number of messages ml, m2,. . ., which may be chosen adaptively by an adversary A who also controls the verifier V'. We say that A successfully attacks the scheme if a forger C, under control of A and pretending to be A P , succeeds in authenticating to a third party D (running the original verifier V 's protocol) a message m # mi, i = 1,2,. . .. The soundness requirement is that all probabilistic polynomial time A will succeed with at most negligible probability.
Zero-Knowledge -Deniability: Consider an adversary A as above and suppose that AP is willing to authenticate any polynomial number of messages. Then for each A there exists a polynomial-time simulator that outputs indistinguishable transcripts.
2.6
Dwork et al.
[ll] have shown the power of time in the design of zero-knowledge protocols through the use of an (0,s)
assumption. This says that all good parties are assumed to have clocks that satisfy the (cr,p)-constraint (where a 5 p): for any two (possibly the same) non-faulty parties PI and P2, if PI measures a elapsed time on its local clock and P 2 measures p elapsed time on its local clock, and PZ begins its measurement in real time after PI begins, then PZ will finish after PI does.
The protocols in (11, 121 use time in two explicit ways: (i) Delays: one party must delay the sending of some message until at least some specified time / 3 has elapsed on its local clock; (ii) Time-outs: one party requires that the other deliver its next message before some specified time a has elapsed on its (first party's) local clock. In this work we are able to eliminate the use of delays; the protocols only use time-outs. An essential ingredient of our protocols is the implicit use of time via moderately hard junctions [9] . In particular, we use the timed commitments with verifiable recovery, described next.
Using Time in the Design of Protocols
T i m e d Commitment. A string commitment protocol allows a sender to commit, to a receiver, to some value. The protocol has two phases. At the end of the commit phase the receiver has gained no information about the commited value, while after the reveal phase the receiver is assured that the revealed value is indeed the one to which the sender originally committed. Timed commitments, defined and constructed by Boneh and Naor [5] , are an extension of the standard notion of commitments in which there is a potential forced opening phase permitting the receiver, by computation of some moderately hard function, to recover the commited value without the help of the committer. The price paid in terms of security is that the committed value is hidden for only a limited amount of time. The important requirements of timed commitments are (i) The future recoverability of the committed value is verifiable: if the commit phase ends successfully, then the receiver is correctly convinced that forced opening will yield the value.
(ii) Forcibly recovered values and decommitments are verifiable: the receiver not only obtains the value, but also a proof of its validity, so that anyone who has the commitment (or the transcript of the commit phase) can verify the value without going through a recovery process, ix. in fixed amount of time. (iii) The commitment is immune to parallel attacks, i.e. even if the receiver has much more computing power than assumed, it cannot recover the value substantially more quickly than a single-processor receiver. We denote by T the bound on the time below which it is safe to assume that the timed commitment cannot be broken with non-negligible probability, even by a PRAM.
Specifically, we are interested in timed commitment schemes with the following structure. The committer sends to the receiver a string C, which constitutes the Commitment.
For every "valid" commitment <, it is possible, through moderately hard computation, t o recover a pair (y, x ) such that x is an easily checked witness to the fact that C is a commitment to y. The set of valid commitments is in NP: For every valid commitment C there is a witness to the statement "C is a valid commitment to a string that can be recovered through the forced recovery process." Finally, the forced recovery time is relatively large compared to the time of all other operations in the protocol (such as, constructing I , verifying a correctly decommitted value, verifying future recoverability, etc.) Thus, we think of all other operations as "easy" while recovery is "moderately hard." The scheme in [5] has this structure and properties.
3
A zap is a 2-round (Zmessage) protocol for proving membership of x E L, where L is a language in NP, satisfying the following conditions3. Letting the first-round (verifier to prover) message be denoted p and the second-round (prover to verifier) response be denoted x :
Completeness: Given x and a witness w E w(x), and a first-round p, the prover, running in time polynomial in 121, can with overwhelming probability generate a proof x that will be accepted by the verifier. The probability is over the choices made by the prover and the verifier. Moreover, the verifier's decision whether to accept or reject is a polynomial time function of x, p , and A (i.e., a zap is a public-coin protocol).
Formal Definition of a Z a p Soundness: With overwhelming probability over choice of p, there exists no x' $ ! L and round-2 message A such that the verifier accepts (x', p, x ) .
3We have chosen to present a non-uniform definition; we could equally well have made the definition uniform.
Witness-Indistinguishability: Let w, w' E w(x) for x E L. Then Vp, the distribution on A when the prover has input (x, w) and the distribution on A when the prover has input (2, there exists a string 6, such that, letting L, = L n (0, l}", 1. Given x E L, and a witness w E w(x), the prover can with probability at least 1-u(n) generate aproof ?r that will be accepted by the verifier. Moreover, the verifier's decision whether to accept or reject is a polynomial time function of x, F, , and A.
2. There exists no x' 4 L, and message A such that the verifier accepts (x', b,, A ) .
3. For all x E L, and all w,w' E w(z), the distributions P ( z , w, b,) and P ( x , w', bn) are indistinguishable by any polynomial time family of distinguishers.
Zaps differ from non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems (NIZKs) in two respects, making the two concepts incomparable. On the one hand, zaps do not require that the prover and verifier have access to a common guaranteed random string. On the other hand, NIZKs provide more provable protection of the witness than do zaps, since NIZKs can be simulated without access to the witness while zaps provide no such guarantee. 4 The NIZK-Based Construction Assume we have a NIZK system (in the shared string model) satisfying Definition 2.2 for a language L. We will construct a zap for L (in the standard model).
Choice of Parameters (General Construction). Assume that we have a NIZK for L that in order to prove membership for strings of length 1x1 uses a common shared string of length e, and on any input y L the NIZK errs with probability at most q. To achieve soundness guarantee 6 for the zap (that is, a cheating prover should succeed with probability at most a), we choose k satisfying
Let x E L be an NP-statement to be proved to the verifier.
We do not need x to be fixed before execution of the protocol begins. Let w be the witness to x E L known by the prover and let PN(x,w,u) be the distribution on messages sent in the NIZK by a (non-cheating) prover when the common random string is U .
The verifier sends to the prover a random k-bit string p = bl . . . bk, which is interpreted as B1 . . . Bm, where Bj denotes the j t h block of 1 consecutive bits and l is the length of the common random string used by the NIZK.
The prover chooses a random &bit string C = c1. . . ct. For j = 1.. . m define u j to be the bitwise exclusive-OR of Bj and C: ~j = Bj @ C. Proof. Fix an x 4 L and random bit string C = c1,. . . , ct.
We will show that with overwhelming probability, over the choice of bl, . . . , bk, the prover will fail to convince the verifier to accept x. The key point is that once everything but the b's has been fixed, the uj's are truly random -because the Bj's are. Therefore each copy of the NIZK proof has probability at most q of failing to cause rejection. Since each proof is independent (because the random bi's used in each copy of the NIZK proof are independent), the overall probability that all m = k / t copies fail is at most qm.
The number of possible assignments to the c's, and x $ ! L is at most 2'+I=l. Hence, as long as (which is guaranteed by our choice of k in (2)) the probability over bl, . . . , bk, that there even exists a "bad" choice of c1,. . . , cc, an x 4 L, and a zap A that erroneously causes the verifier to accept x, is at most 6 (cf. the soundness requirement in Definition 2.2). Since 6 < 1, there must exist some fl, = bl . . . b k ( , ) that provides soundness against all 3 : # L,: in, A ) rejects. Proof. The proof is via a standard hybrid argument. Let w and w' be two witnesses that x E L, and let n = 1x1. We build a chain of distributions of transcripts. At one extreme, the witness w is used in each of the m NIZKs; at the other extreme the witness w' is used in every copy. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time test T and 1 5 j 5 m such that for some a fixed a and infinitely many n:
where (w, w', i) denotes the transcript in which the witness used in the first i copies of the NIZK is w and the witness used in the remaining m -i copies is w'. The probability space is over the random choices made by the verifier (bl, . . . , bk), the choices made by the prover, and the randomness of T. We will show that this contradicts the witness-indistinguishability of the underlying NIZK.
Let (P', V*) be the underlying NIZK protocol (running in the shared random string model). Let T be a truly random string of t bits. Choose U E R {w,w'} and give U to P'. Let P' generate the proof A E PN(x,u,7). By the witness-indistinguishability of the NIZK, with overwhelming probability over choice of T , no probabilistic polynomial time machine, even given w and w', has non-negligible advantage of guessing the value of U from A.
Construct a simulated transcript of Protocol Z as follows. On input bl, . . . , bk from the verifier, break the bi's into blocks B1,. . . , B f . Set C = 7 @ B j (so that uj = B j @ C = T). For all i < j, construct ~i E R P N ( z , w , o i ) . For all i > j, construct R, ER PN(z,w',ui). Set nj = R E PN(z,u,.r).
Run T on the resulting transcript. Since T is uniformly distributed, C is uniformly distributed as well, so the resulting transcript of m NIZKs is distributed exactly as either (w,w',j -1) (if U = w') or ( w , w ' , j ) (if U = w). We can therefore use T's assumed ability to distinguish these two cases to obtain a non-negligible advantage in guessing whether U = w or U = w'. . Critically, the simulator may choose the common string (and may in particular choose the string to be pseudo-random). Thus, given a common random string U , the prover uses a zap to prove in a witness-indistinguishable fashion that U is pseudo-random or z E L. Simulation is accomplished as above. 0 5 Zaps a n d Verifiable Pseudo-Random B i t Generators An ( s , k) verifiable pseudo-random generator (VPRG) is a pseudo-random sequence generator which, on input security parameter l", chooses a seed of length s ( n ) and produces an output a l , . . . , ak(,,) of length k(n), where s and IC are fixed polynomials, together with a public verification key V K .
The requirements are:
Binding: The public verification key V K binds the sequence: there is only one sequence consistent with V K .
Verifiability: For any subset I of indices in (1,. . . , k ( n ) } ,
given the seed g E (0, l}S(n) it is easy to construct a proof R of the values of {ai}iE,. Given V K the verifier can check the proof R of the consistency of {ai};EI with V K .
P a s s i n g the i t h B i t Test:
For all non-uniform polynomial time T, for all 1 5 i 5 IC, the probability, over choice of the seed, the random choices in the construction of the proof R , and the random choicer; by T that T, given V K , { a j } j + i , and a proof R of consistency with V K , outputs ai is negligibly close to We also use a relaxation of VPRGs, which we call d ( n ) - In the standard model we w i l l exhibit a construction of zaps from VPRGs (Protocol VZ below). As we will see, the construction works even if the VPRG is approximate, in that the "proofs" of the bit values are occasionally incorrectly accepted, so it is possible to "cheat" a little. We will also show that if zaps exist then so do a p proximate VPRGs. Very roughly, approximate VPRGs can be designed to have multiple witnesses, so zaps, with their witness-indistinguishability, are sufficiently strong t o yield the necessary proofs R of consistency with some member in
S ( V K ) . In contrast, we do not know how to design strict
VPRGs to have multiple witnesses. The next remark summarizes the relationships between zaps, VPRGs, and NIZKs, both in the standard model and in the common baaranteed random string model. 
Zaps exists in the standard model if and only if approximate VPRGs (with certain pammeters) exist in the standard model (Corollary 5.5 and Theorem 5.6).

Proofs Based o n H i d d e n Random Strings
We find the following physical intuition helpful. The prover is dealt a sequence of e binary cards, where each card has value 1 with probability 1/2. The prover knows the values of the cards and can choose any subset to reveal to the verifier. The verifier learns absolutely nothing about the values of cards that are not explicitly revealed. The prover has no control over the values of the cards. The sequence of cards is a hidden mndom string (HRS).
To prove that x E L, the prover, holding witness w E w(x), can choose any subset of the hidden bits to reveal to the verifier (cards to turn over). Let a be the locations and values of the revealed bits in the HRS. In addition to a, the prover may send extra information p to the verifier. The verifier decides whether to accept or reject x as a function of a, /3, and x.
For soundness, we require that for some non-negligible q, the probability (over the values of the hidden random bits) that the prover can cause the verifier to accept an x $ L is at most 1 -q , even if the prover is arbitrarily powerful. For witness indistinguishability we require that there exist a simulator that
can create (a,p) identically distributed to the (a,/3)
pairs created in real executions of the proof; 2. given a, 0, and any witness w ' to x E L, can generate the remaining cards so that the distribution on extended transcripts (the hidden cards, the revealed cards a, and p) is identical to the distribution on extended transcripts in real executions by a prover holding witness w'. We call this "completing the simulation with
The concept of an HRS-based proof is exemplified by the noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system of Feige, Lapidot, and Shamir [14] (see also, e.g., [ 
21]).
Protocol VZ: A VPRG-based Z a p The choice of parameters for VPRG-based zaps differs slightly from the choice in the case of NIZK-based zaps. This is because in the case of the VPRG we have less freedom: k is tied to the VPRG.
Choice of Parameters: Assume we have an HRS-based proof that uses e cards and on any input x errs with probability at most q. Let s be a seed permitting the VPRG to output k bits. To achieve soundness guarantee 6 (that is, a cheating prover should succeed with probability at most 6), we require that k satisfy T h e Protocol: Let m = k / t . The verifier sends to the prover random bits bl, . . . , bk.
The prover chooses e random bits c1, . . . , cf and a seed s.
Let al, a 2 , . . . , as, V K be the output of the VPRG generator.
The ith bit of the HRS is defined to be ai @ bi @ G mod t.
The prover sends to the verifier: V K , c1, . . . , cc, and m HRSbased proofs that x E L, where the j t h proof uses the j t h block of e bits of the HRS.
Let (aj, Pj) be the values of the revealed cards and additional information in the j t h copy of the HRS-based proof, for j = 1,. . . , m. For revealed card the verifier, using V K , checks that the value revealed is the correct one. If not, the verifier rejects; otherwise the verifier accepts iff for each copy of the HRS-based proof, the HRS-based verifier accepts. Proof. Let x $ L, c l , . . . , 9 , and the VPRG verification key V K be fixed. We will show that with overwhelming probability, over the choice of bl, . . . , bk, the prover will fail to convince the verifier to accept x. The key point is that once everything but the b's has been fixed, the hidden random string is truly random -because bl, . . . , bk are. Therefore each copy of the HRS-based proof has probability at most q of failing to cause rejection. Since each proof is independent (because the b,'s used in each copy of the HRS-based proof are independent), the overall probability that all m = k / e copies fail is at most 9"'.
The number of possible assignments to the c's, VK's, and x $ L is at most 2'+lSl+lzl. Hence, as long as for a mndom bl , . . . , bk, the probability that there even exists a "bad" choice of c1,. . . , cf, V K , and x that erroneously causes the verifier to accept, is at most 6. Thus, not only is the protocol sound, but the first message (the b's) can be fixed non-uniformly. 0
T h e o r e m 5.4 Given an HRS-based proof system f o r L using e cards and having probability of error at most q, and given a VPRG mapping a seed s to k bits, if then protocol VZ is a zap for L.
Note that if instead of a VPRG we use a d(n)-approximate VPRG, then we can obtain a similar result: Corollary 5.5 Given an HRS proof system for L using e cards and with probability of error at most q and given a d(n)-approximate VPRG mapping a seed s to k bits, if then protocol VZ is a zap for L .
As we show next, the converse holds as well and we can use zaps in order to obtain approximate VPRGs.
T h e o r e m 5.6 Let k ( n ) be any polynomial. Fix m 2 2. Let f be any pseudo-random generator taking a seed of length s(n) and producing an output of length k(n). Then, using zaps, one can construct a d(n)-approximate VPRG expanding a seed of length ms(n) to a string of length m k ( n ) , where d ( n ) = m2'(,).
Note that the expansion is arbitrary, since k ( n ) is an arbitrary polynomial and pseudo-random generators exist for any polynomial expansion, based on any one-way function.
Remark 5.7 In the case of ordinary pseudo-random generators, it is known that the ability to expand by even one bit can be w e d to obtain arbitrary expansion. Is the same true of (approximate) verifiable pseudo-random generators? &om Corollary 4.4, Theorem 5.2, and Corollary 5.5 we have only a higher threshold: if any polynomial expansion is possible (from n to n'+€ for jixed E ) , then we can build zaps and hence arbitrary expansion.
Construction of VPRGs
A VPRG can trivially be constructed from any verifiable pseudo-random function (see, e.g., [23] ), since if the domain of the VPRF is small one obtains a VPRG. However, such a construction is "overkill;" moreover, the only known constructions we have of VPRFs require the Strong-RSA assumption.
We provide an alternate construction, following along the lines of the trapdoor-based synthesizer of Nmr and Reingold [25] . To obtain (non approximate) VPRGs we require that the trapdoor permutation be certified (see [l] ).
We assume the existence of a family 7, of certified t r a p door permutations with common domain D,, together with a hard-core predicate ( n is a security parameter). The VPRG output is given as a binary matrix (say, in row-major order). The matrix has r rows and c columns, where rc = k.
Choose r functions f 1 , . . . f r , from T (one for each row) and c random y's (one for each column) in the intersection of the ranges of all the trapdoor permutations. The ( i , j ) entry of the matrix will be the hard-core bit of fL1(yj).
Let V K = f1,. . . , frryl,. . . ,yc. To prove the value of the ( i , j) entry, reveal f,T'(yj). Verification is immediate using VK and the fact that each fi is a permutation.
The length of the seed s is r log 1 7 , I + clog ID,, 1. As n is fixed and k grows, the expansion is roughly quadratic. This completes the description of our VPRG construction. The proof that it satisfies the ith bit test closely follows the proof in 1251.
The standard example of a certifiable trapdoor function is RSA with prime public exponent e satisfying e > N . If we relax the perfect binding requirement and instead aim for an approximate VPRG, then we can use any trapdoor permutation. For instance, we can use RSA with small exponent: associate with the j t h column the j t h smallest prime. The (i,j)th output bit is the hard-core bit of y;"' mod Ni. The possible problem is that pj may divide d ( N i ) . In this case yj may have multiple pjth roots, possibly with different hardcore bits, and the owner of the generator can "cheat." However, there can be at most INil/loglNil such primes. We can take this into account in setting the parameters. This construction is very related to Shamir's pseudo-random generator [28] .
Timing-Based Applications
In this section we describe two delay-free timing-based (see Section 2.6) applications for zaps:
for any language L E NP 3-round concurrent zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge 2-round deniable authentication 6.1 3-round C o n c u r r e n t Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge A t high level the protocol consists of two steps. Let x E L be the statement to be proved.
(1) The verifier chooses a statement S and proves, using a zap, that S is true; (2) the prover gives a proof of knowledge of a witness to the statement "x E L v S". Intuitively, soundness comes from the fact that the verifier's proof does not reveal a witness to S. This is achieved by constructing S to be the logical-or of two independent statements -in such a case witnessindistinguishability is known to imply witness-hiding [13] . A single pre-processing step is needed for both the proof of knowledge and to provide the first-round p for the verifier's zap of S.
In a little more detail, the statement S is a claim that of two given timed commitments to two random strings, at least one is valid -forced recovery of the committed value is possible (see the discussion in Section 2.6). Verifiable recovery implies the existence of a knowledge extractor. The extractor is used in constructing the simulator for proving zero-knowledge. cause this only gives a probability 1/2 of detecting cheating, the process is repeated many times in parallel. The preprocessing step ( Step 1 in the protocol) is just the transmission of sufficiently many pairs of the form f(k)(sO), f(k)(s'), together with a p for the verifier's zap in Step 2.
Let f be a one-way function.
Common input x E L , input to prover w E w ( x ) .
Let f be a fixed one-way permutation (f is part of the protocol, known to both parties). The prover sends to the verifier 2p pairs for randomly chosen s3, i = 1,. . . ,2p and :j = 0 , l .
The prover also sends to the verifier p, a roundone message for a zap.
The verifier selects a random 2phit string c1 . . . CZP.
The verifier chooses two random values yo and y1 of length p , and constructs from them two commitment strings CO and C l using the timed com- Specifically, it sends z @ B1, . . . , z @ Bp; similarly it commits to w, using blocks Bp+l . . . BzP. We call the commitments to z and w, the first and second groups, respectively. Using p', the prover constructs a proof n' that at least one of the following two statements holds: (1) there exists z consistent with all of the commitments in the first group and z is the value committed to in one of the timed commitments (0 or C1; or (2) Timing constmints: V accepts P's Round 3 message only if arrives within time a on V's local clock from the time at which V sent its Round 2 message. o and /3 (for the timing assumption) should be chosen to satisfy a 5 and 2p + -y < T, where the value T is the time below which it is safe to assume that the timed commitment cannot be broken, even by a PRAM, and -y is an upper bound on the time it takes to create a zap by a program that is given a witness. For completeness, a must be sufficiently large to permit the necessary computations by P, and the round-trip message delay.
The protocol is concurrent zero knowledge because it is straight-line simulable via the forced openings: every interaction can be simulated without rewinding the prover [12] . To see this, consider a single interaction. The simulator generates a real round-one message, which is given to the verifier. The verifier constructs its timed commitments and their proof n. The simulator checks A and, if it is correct, continues with the protocol. The clocks are frozen and the simulator computes the forced opening of the timed commitments, obtaining y, the de-commitment of one of b and C1. The clocks are started again, the simulator sets z = y, commits to z and a random string (instead of w), and constructs n' using the commitment to z as the witness. When the adversarial scheduler schedules P's next message, the simulator sends A'. Now consider four classes of transcripts: they differ according to the value committed to in the first block (random or z = y), the value committed to in the second block (w or random), and which witness is used in creating the zap A' (w or 2). Only four possibilities are relevant: (1) First block: random; Second block: w; witness is w; (2) First block: z = y; Second block: random; witness is y; We now argue that the interaction is sound and a proof of knowledge. If the prover completes the proof with probability 6, then standard extraction techniques can be used to obtain a witness (strings si-'' for the appropriate set of indices i ) with probability negligibly close to a2.
Suppose x @ L, and that a cheating prover succeeds with non-negligible probability 6 to cause the verifier to accept.
Then the timed commitment scheme can be broken with probability negligibly close to b 2 / 2 , as follows. Consider a (possibly fictitious) non-faulty process running a perfect clock. By the (a, p) assumption, if V is non-faulty and measures time at most a on its own clock between the time at which it sent its round 2 message and the time at which it received P's round 3 reply, at most p real time has elapsed.
Assume we are given a timed commitment 61 E R TC(y).
Run the cheating prover for one step. Choose c1. . . By the witness-indistinguishability of the verifier's zap, the value will be y with probability 1/2. The total time required for extraction is at most 2p + -y < T contradicting the assumption that breaking the timed commitment requires time at least T. Thus, the system is sound. That the system is a proof of knowledge is immediate from the extraction procedure described above.
Theorem 6.1 The protocol described above is a 3-round timed concurrent zero-knowledge proof of knowledge system for any language L in NP.
Remark 6.2 The stmight-line simulability also permits the prover to use differing (a, p) pairs for the different verifiers.
T i m e d 2-round Deniable Authentication
We now describe a 2-round timed concurrent deniable authentication protocol, based on zaps and timed commitments.
The A P has a public key El, E2,p, where E1 and E 2 are public encryption keys chosen according to a publickey cryptosystem generator that is non-malleable against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the post-processing mode, and p is a first-round message for a zap.
1. The verifier chooses random strings yo, y1, r and sends to the prover c E R E l ( m o r ) and timed commitments CO E R TC(yo) and 61 E R TC(y1). In addition, using p , the verifier gives a zap that at least one of the ( i is valid. Finally, the verifier also sends to the prover a first-round message p' for a zap.
2. The prover checks the zap (p, A ) and aborts if verification fails. Otherwise, the prover sends to the verifier q E R Ei(r), 6 E R E2(s) for a randomly chosen s. Using p', the prover sends a zap A' that at least one of the following holds: q E E l ( r ) or s E (y0,yl) (more specifically, A' is a proof that q is an encryption under E1 of the s u f i of the message encrypted by ciphertext c OR 6 is an encryption under E2 of one of the values committed to by < I , €2). The witness used in creating A' is the set of random bits in creating a.
V accepts if and only if both (1) the zap (p', A') is accepted and (2) P's response is received in a tamely fashion, as specified in the timing constraints.
Taming constmints P's Round 2 message must arrive within time a on V's local clock from the time a t which V sent its Round 1 message. a and 0 are chosen to satisfy a 5 0 and 0 + 7 < T, where the value T is the time below which it is safe to assume that the timed commitment cannot be broken, even by a PRAM, and 7 is an upper bound on the time it takes to create a zap by a program that is given a witness. For completeness, a must be sufficiently large to permit the necessary computations by P, and the round-trip message delay.
This completes the description of the deniable authentication protocol. The proof of correctness is omitted for lack of space. Theorem 6.3 The 2-round protocol is sound and deniable. 
Witness Protection in t h e Resettable Model
Reset table W i t ness-Indist inguishability Every zap for a language L E N P yields a 2-round resettable witness-indistinguishable proof system for L as follows. On input p, the prover computes R = fs(x,p), where f. is a pseudo-random function with seed s. It then uses the bits R as the "random" bits in computing the zap response A.
Soundness holds because the round-one message p is not needed for unpredictability -indeed, soundness holds even if some , ? is fixed non-uniformly and before z is chosen. As for witness-indistinguishability, from the WI of the zap it follows that a distinguisher for the resettable system can be used to distinguish the output of the pseuderandom function from truly random.
Resettable Zero-Knowledge
We first present our bround timing-based rZK protocol for any L E N P , and then compare it to previous results.
Let (E, 0 ) be the encryption and decryption algorithms of a semantically secure encryption method. The scheme need not be public-key, but there should be a public description pd of the encryption key with the following two properties. (1) It is easy to verify that decryption is unique, that is, given ciphertext c and a public description pd there should be at most one p satisfying c E E ( p ) . ( 2 ) Given pd it is easy to verify that there exists decryption key d k such that given c E E(p) we have &(c) = p.
An example of such an encryption scheme can be based on an RSA public key (e,N) in which the exponent e is prime and sufficiently large (so that e cannot possibly divide 4 ( N ) ) ; pd = ( e , N ) in this case. Alternatively, E could be a pseuderandom permutation cipher (with padding) where p d is a commitment to the seed.
For this application, we require that the timed commitment scheme be secure non-uniformly, i.e. that there does not exist a PRAM with fixed advice tape that can break the commitment scheme with non-negligible probability in time less than T.
3-round Timing-Based r Z K for L E N P 1. The prover chooses pd (the public description of the encryption key of E ) and a random string p and sends both to the verifier.
2. The verifier checks that encryptions under E are uniquely decryptable (as discussed above) and if not, rejects. Assuming E passes the test, the verifier chooses random strings y0,yl and sends to the prover timed commitments CO E R TC(yo),Ci E R TC(y1) and, using p, a zap A that at least one of the two timedcommitments is valid. The verifier also sends a string p' to the prover.
3. The prover checks (A,P). If it is accepted, then the prover uses the random bits defined by an application of its pseuderandom function on the message sent by the verifier to generate a E R E(w) and b E R E ( z ) where w E w(x) and z is random. Using p' and part of the output of the pseudo-random function the prover also generates a zap A' that w E w(z) OR a E {yo,y~}.
The witness used consists of the random bits used in generating a. a, b and A' are sent.
The verifier checks that (p', A') is accepted, that b has unique decryption and that the prover's response was timely, as defined by the timing constraints, accepting if and only if all conditions are satisfied.
Timing Constraints: P's Round 2 message must arrive within time a on V's local clock from the time at which V sent its Round 1 message. a and p (from the timing assumption) are chosen to satisfy a 5 p and p+? < T, where the value T is the time below which it is safe to assume that the timed commitment cannot be broken, even by a PRAM, and 7 is an upper bound on the time it takes to create a zap by a program that is given a witness. For complete ness, a must be sufficiently large to permit the necessary computations by P , and the round-trip message delay.
Note that the only party that has to measure time is V, which is considered more resourceful than the prover (who may be a smart-card with no independent clock) in the resettable setting Theorem 7.1 For any L E N P the above protocol is rZK.
Proof.
A straight-line simulator can be constructed in a similar fashion to the construction in the proof of Theorem 6.1. For soundness we use the ezistence of a decryption algorithm D with decryption key dk. If the protocol is not sound, then this key can be used to break the timed commitment in exactly the same way as the proof of knowledge was used in the proof of Theorem 6.1, violating the assumed non-uniform security of the timed commitment. We therefore have a non-constructive reduction: given an algorithm for providing false proofs for L we know there exists an algorithm for breaking the timed-commitment; however, the reduction does not yield an effective method for the conversion.
Note that a proof of security which does not yield an effective procedure to break the underlying assumptions is rare.
0
Open Questions
One vein of open problems induced by this work is with respect to the new primitive VPRG: Can VPRGs be composed to build pseudo-random functions, as can ordinary pseud-random generators (15] ? This is related to the issue of constructing VPRGs with better expansion as well as to the question whether there is a general construction of VPRFs from VPRGs. A different issue is whether VPRGs can be based on an assumption weaker than trapdoor permutations? For example, is it possible to base VPRGs on the Diffie-Hellman assumption?
A second vein of questions deals with efficiency and practicality. We have used general NIZKs; thus any proof must go through a reduction to an NP-complete problem. It would be useful to have more efficient, special-purpose zaps, for instance, a zap that one of x and y is a quadratic residue modulo N . Another concrete question regarding zaps is to construct one in conjunction with a timed-commitment, so that it will be simple to prove consistency.
A third vein of questions deals with round-efficiency: in which cases are our protocols round-optimal? It is not hard to argue that 2-round (non-black-box) zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge are impossible, even using timing. However, we do not know whether or not 2-round (non-blackbox) zer-knowledge proofs are possible, with or without timing.
